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Abstract. We consider n-player perfect information games with payoff functions having
a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain
from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and
assumptions like continuity or measurability of payoff functions. We show that there
exists a best response cycle of length four, that is, a sequence of four pure strategy
profiles where every successive element is a best response to the previous one. This
result implies the existence of point-rationalizable strategy profiles. When payoffs are
only required to be bounded, we show the existence of an -best response cycle of length
four for every  > 0.
Keywords: perfect information games • determinacy • best-response cycles • rationalizability
1. Introduction
We consider n-player perfect information games that are played over a tree of countably infinite length. At every
node of the tree, called a history, a single player chooses an action. The resulting infinite sequence of actions is
called a play and determines the payoff for every player.
We are very general with respect to the assumptions put on the set of available actions and the payoff
functions. We make no assumptions on the set of available actions, so in particular we abstain from making
assumptions on its cardinality or its topology. We assume payoff functions to have a finite image for some of
our results and to have a bounded image for others, so we make no continuity or measurability assumptions
with respect to payoff functions.
A special case of our setup are win-lose games as studied by Gale and Stewart [4]. Win-lose games are two-
player zero-sum games where the payoff of a player is either zero or one. Another way to describe such games
is to introduce a winning set of plays. Player 1 gets a payoff of one if and only if the play is an element of
the winning set. Such a game is said to be determined if either player 1 has a winning strategy, i.e., a strategy
that guarantees the play to be an element of the winning set irrespective of the strategy chosen by player 2, or
player 2 has a winning strategy. A win-lose game is determined if and only if it has a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Gale and Stewart [4] show that there are win-lose games that are not determined.
We first consider n-player perfect information games under the assumption that the payoff functions have a
finite image. Using elementary methods, we show that there exists a best-response cycle of length four—that
is, a sequence of pure strategy profiles (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) such that every successive element is a best response to
its predecessor. The strategy profiles forming a best-response cycle are point rationalizable (Bernheim [1]), and
they survive any procedure of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (Chen et al. [2], Dufwenberg
and Stegeman [3]).
Since a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a best-response cycle of length one, the results of Gale and Stewart [4]
demonstrate that even two-player zero-sum games may fail to have a best-response cycle of length one. Our
results imply that there always exists a best-response cycle of length four.
We continue by weakening the assumption that payoff functions have a finite image to the assumption that
payoff functions have a bounded image. If, moreover, the payoff functions were Borel measurable, then a result
shown by Mertens and Neyman (reported in Mertens [7]) is that, for every positive , an –Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies exists, and therefore an –best-response cycle of length one exists. We show that boundedness
of the payoff functions is sufficient for the existence of an –best-response cycle of length four.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces perfect information games, and Section 3
presents our results on the existence of best-response cycles. The proof of the main result, Theorem 3.1, is
provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Perfect Information Games
Let  be the set of natural numbers including zero. Given a set A, we let A< denote the set of finite sequences
of elements of A, including the empty sequence . A nonempty sequence h ∈ A< is written as h  (a0 , . . . , at)
for some t ∈. We let A be the set of countably infinite sequences p  (a0 , a1 , . . .), where at ∈ A for every t ∈.
A perfect information game consists of the following elements:
• A nonempty set of actions A.
• A set of histories H ⊆ A<, which is required to be a pruned tree. That is, (1)  ∈H; (2) if h  (a0 , . . . , at′) ∈H
and 0 ≤ t ≤ t′, then (a0 , . . . , at) ∈H; and (3) if h ∈H, then there is a ∈ A such that (h , a) ∈H. A play is an element
p  (a0 , a1 , . . .) of A such that (a0 , . . . , at) ∈ H for every t ∈ . The set of all plays is denoted by P.
• A finite set of players I  {1, . . . , n}.
• A function ι: H→ I that assigns an active player to every history. We let H i  {h ∈ H: ι(h) i} be the set of
histories where player i is active.
• For every i ∈ I, a payoff function u i : P→.
The reader will notice that we exclude “terminal histories,” as we assume that some action can be played
after every history h ∈ H. Nevertheless, games with terminal histories are encompassed as a special case of
our setup. For example, games of length two are those where the payoff u i(p) depends only on the first two
coordinates of p.
For two histories h, h′ ∈ H, we say that h′ follows h, denoted as h ≤ h′, if either h   or h  (a0 , . . . , at) for
some t ∈  and h′  (a0 , . . . , at′) for some t′ ∈  such that t ≤ t′. A history h ∈ H is said to be a prefix of the play
p  (a0 , a1 , . . .) if h  or h  (a0 , . . . , at) for some t ∈. Given h ∈H, we let P(h) denote the set of all plays p ∈ P
such that h is a prefix of p. Let A(h) {a ∈ A: (h , a) ∈ H} be the set of actions available at h.
A pure strategy for player i is a function s i with domain H i such that s i(h) ∈ A(h) for every h ∈ H i . We only
consider pure strategies. Let Si be the set of player i’s pure strategies, and let S ∏i∈I Si be the set of pure
strategy profiles. Given s ∈ S and h ∈H, we write s(h) to mean s i(h) for i  ι(h). The play induced by s is denoted
by pi(s). We write U i(s) u i(pi(s)). Given s ∈ S and σi ∈ Si , we let s/σi denote the strategy profile obtained from
s by replacing player i’s strategy s i by σi .
We work in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice.
3. Best-Response Cycles
We first state our definition and results for the case where for every player i ∈ I the payoff functions u i have a
finite image. A strategy σi ∈ Si is player i’s best response to the strategy profile s ∈ S if for every τi ∈ Si it holds
that U i(s/τi) ≤ U i(s/σi). Notice that if the image of the payoff function u i is finite, player i always has a best
response to any strategy profile. A strategy profile σ ∈ S is said to be a best response to s ∈ S if for every i ∈ I, σi
is player i’s best response to s.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function u i is finite. Then there exists a best-response
cycle of length four—that is, a sequence (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) of pure strategy profiles such that every successive element is a
best response to the previous one.
This result has important implications for the behavior of the best-response map. For s ∈ S, let B i(s) denote
the set of player i’s best responses to s, and let B(s) denote the product set of best responses to s; thus
B(s)∏
i∈I
B i(s).
Define the best-response map B: 2S→ 2S by letting B(), and for every nonempty subset E of S,
B(E)⋃
s∈E
B(s)⋃
s∈E
∏
i∈I
B i(s).
By construction, the map B is monotone with respect to set inclusion; i.e., B(E) ⊆ B(E′) if E ⊆ E′. Consequently,
the set of fixed points of B is a complete lattice (Tarski [8]). Of course,  is a fixed point of B. The set F ⋃{E ∈
2S: E ⊆ B(E)} is the greatest fixed point of B. Theorem 3.1 implies that there is a nonempty set E ∈ 2S such that
E ⊆ B(E)—for instance, the set consisting of the four strategy profiles forming the best-response cycle. We thus
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function u i is finite. Then the set F is nonempty.
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Connection to Determinacy
A win-lose game is said to be determined if either player 1 has a winning strategy, i.e., a strategy that guarantees
the play to be an element of the winning set irrespective of the strategy chosen by player 2, or player 2 has a
winning strategy. If we endow the set of plays P with a topology having as base the collection of cylinder sets
P(h) for h ∈ H, then it has been shown that a win-lose game is determined if the winning set is closed (Gale
and Stewart [4]), Borel (Martin [5]), or quasi-Borel (Martin [6]). Under these conditions, a win-lose game has
a best-response cycle of length one. Theorem 3.1 implies that any win-lose game has a best-response cycle of
length four.
Connection to Point Rationalizability
Bernheim ([1], p. 1015) defines the map λ: 2S→ 2S by
λ(E)∏
i∈I
⋃
s∈E
B i(s).
The greatest fixed point of λ is the set of point-rationalizable strategy profiles.
The difference between the definition of B and that of λ could be understood as a difference in the order of
the quantifiers: a strategy profile σ is an element of B(E) if there exists an s ∈ E such that for each i ∈ I, the
strategy σi is a best response to s. On the other hand, σ is an element of λ(E) if for each i ∈ I there exists an
s ∈ E such that σi is a best response to s. In essence, the definition of B embodies the restriction that any two
players hold the same beliefs about a third player, a restriction that is not imposed under the definition of λ.
It holds that B(E) ⊆ λ(E) for each E ∈ 2S. Consequently, the greatest fixed point F of B is contained in the
greatest fixed point of λ. In particular, if the sequence of strategy profiles (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) is a best-response
cycle of length four, then the strategy profiles σ0, σ1, σ2, and σ3 are point rationalizable. Theorem 3.1 thus implies
the existence of point-rationalizable strategy profiles in perfect information games where the payoff functions
have a finite image.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function u i is finite. Then the set of point-rationalizable
strategy profiles is nonempty.
Connection to Strict Dominance
For every i ∈ I , consider sets D i ⊆ Ei ⊆ Si , and let D ∏i∈I D i and E ∏i∈I Ei . Following Dufwenberg and
Stegeman [3], we write E→D if D is obtained from E by eliminating strictly dominated strategies; that is, for
every i ∈ I, for every s i ∈Ei\D i , there exists σi ∈Ei such that for every s−i ∈E−i it holds that U i(s i , s−i)<U i(σi , s−i).
We say that E ⊆ S is a reduction of S if there exists a sequence S  E0→ E1→ · · · such that E ⋂m∈ Em .
Let F be the greatest fixed point of the map B. If E→ D and F ⊆ E, then also F ⊆ D. Consequently, any
reduction of S contains F as a subset and is nonempty. We thus conclude that the strategy profiles in F survive
any procedure of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. This conclusion remains valid even under
a more permissive definition of reductions that allows for arbitrary transfinite sequences of sets as in Chen
et al. [2], rather than just countable sequences as in Dufwenberg and Stegeman [3].
Now we turn to the case where the image of u i is allowed to be any bounded set of real numbers. The
generalization of Theorem 3.1 is obtained through the concept of –best response.
Let  be some positive real number. A strategy σi ∈ Si is said to be player i’s –best response to the strategy
profile s ∈ S if for every τi ∈ Si it holds that U i(s/τi) < U i(s/σi) + . A strategy profile σ ∈ S is said to be an
–best response to s ∈ S if for every player i ∈ I, σi is an –best response to s.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that for every i ∈ I, the image of the payoff function u i is bounded. Then for every  > 0 there
exists an –best-response cycle of length four—that is, a sequence (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) of pure strategy profiles such that
every successive element is an –best response to the previous one.
To deduce Theorem 3.4 from Theorem 3.1, for i ∈ I, let u¯ i be defined by letting u¯ i(p) min{m: u i(p) ≤ m},
where m takes integer values. Since u i is bounded, u¯ i has a finite image, and u i(p) ≤ u¯ i(p) < u i(p)+ . Let U¯ i
denote the induced payoff function over strategy profiles.
Let (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) be a best-response cycle of length four as in Theorem 3.1 for the game with payoff
functions (u¯1 , . . . , u¯n). For k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, for every i ∈ I , for every τi ∈ Si , it holds that
U i(σk/τi) ≤ U¯ i(σk/τi) ≤ U¯ i(σk/σik+1) <U i(σk/σik+1)+ ,
where σi4  σi0. It therefore follows that (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) is an –best-response cycle of length four.
We define the maps B i and B analogously to B i and B. The map B is called the –best-response map. We let
F denote the greatest fixed point of B. The following corollary is immediate.
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Corollary 3.5. Suppose that for every i ∈ I, the image of the payoff function u i is bounded. Then for each  > 0, the set
F is nonempty.
Let  be a positive real number. A pure strategy profile s ∈ S such that s ∈B(s) is called an –Nash equilibrium.
An –Nash equilibrium corresponds to an –best-response cycle of length one. A result due to Mertens and
Neyman (reported by Mertens [7]) asserts that a perfect information game admits an –Nash equilibrium for
every  > 0 provided that the payoff functions are bounded and Borel measurable. The proof of existence of
–equilibria in perfect information games by Mertens and Neyman relies on Borel determinacy as shown in
Martin [5]. Therefore, if payoff functions are bounded and Borel measurable, then there exists an –best-response
cycle of length one. Theorem 3.4 implies that the boundedness of the payoff functions is sufficient to guarantee
the existence of an –best-response cycle of length four.
4. Proof of Theorem 3.1
For a game G as in Section 2 and a history h ∈ H, we define the subgame G(h) of G as the game with set of
actions A, set of players I, set of histories Hh  {e ∈ A<: (h , e) ∈ H}, an assignment of active players ιh : Hh→ I
given by ιh(e)  ι(h , e), and payoff functions given by u ih(p)  u i(h , p) for every play p of G(h). Here, (h , e) and(h , p) are concatenations defined in the obvious way. The induced payoff functions over strategy profiles are
denoted by U ih . If σ is a strategy profile in G and τ a strategy profile in G(h), we say that σ agrees with τ if
σ(h , e) τ(e) for every history e in G(h).
Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2 give some sufficient conditions for the game to have a best-response cycle of length four.
Lemma 4.1 asserts that, if for every action a the subgame G(a) has a best-response cycle of length four, so does
the entire game.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that for every a ∈ A() the subgame G(a) has a best-response cycle (σa , 0 , σa , 1 , σa , 2 , σa , 3 , σa , 0) of
length four. Then the game G has a best-response cycle (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ4 , σ0) of length four such that for every a ∈ A() the
strategy σk agrees with σa , k .
Proof. Let i  ι(). Let some k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be given, and let ak ∈ A() be such that U ia(σa , k−1/σia , k) is maximized
over a ∈ A(). Define the strategy profile σk by σk()  ak and, for every a ∈ A(), by letting σk agree with σa , k
in G(a).
By the choice of the action ak and since σiak−1 , k is a best response to σak−1 , k−1 in the subgame G(ak−1), the
strategy profile σk is a best response to σk−1. Thus the sequence (σ0 , σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ0) is a best-response cycle of
length four in G. 
For a play p  (a0 , a1 , . . .), we define p(0) a0. A strategy profile s is said to have the property that all players
follow p if s()  a0 and s(a0 , . . . , at)  at+1 for each t ∈ . Let w i be the highest possible payoff for player i, and
let W i be the set of plays where the maximum is attained, so
w i max
p∈P
u i(p) and W i  {p ∈ P: u i(p) w i}.
Lemma 4.2. Let i  ι(). Suppose that there exist two plays—say, p and q—such that u i(p) u i(q)w i and p(0), q(0).
Then the game G has a best-response cycle of length four.
Proof. Let σ0 be a strategy profile such that all players follow p. Clearly, σi0 is player i’s best response to σ0.
Choose some σ1 ∈ B(σ0) with σi1  σi0 and choose σ2 ∈ B(σ1). Symmetrically, let τ0 be a strategy profile such that
all players follow q. Choose some τ1 ∈ B(τ0) with τi1  τi0 and choose τ2 ∈ B(τ1).
Let the strategy profiles s0, s1, s2, and s3 be such that
s i0  σ
i
0 and s
j
0(h)
{
σ
j
0(h) if p(0) < h ,
τ
j
2(h) if q(0) < h;
s i1  σ
i
0 and s
j
1(h)
{
σ
j
1(h) if p(0) < h ,
τ
j
0(h) if q(0) < h;
s i2  τ
i
0 and s
j
2(h)
{
σ
j
2(h) if p(0) < h ,
τ
j
0(h) if q(0) < h;
s i3  τ
i
0 and s
j
3(h)
{
σ
j
0(h) if p(0) < h ,
τ
j
1(h) if q(0) < h;
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where j , i. Notice that s0 is a strategy profile such that all players follow p and s2 is a strategy profile such
that all players follow q.
We argue that s1 ∈ B(s0). To see that s i1 is a best response to s0 for player i, notice that pi(s0/s i1)  p , which is
a maximizer of u i . For j , i, it also holds that s j1 is a best response to s0. Indeed, under s0, player i plays action
p(0) at history , the same action as under σ0. In the subgame G(p(0)), the strategy profile s0 coincides with σ0
while s j1 coincides with σ
j
1. Since σ
j
1 is a best response to σ0, it follows that s
j
1 is a best response to s0 for player j.
We argue that s2 ∈ B(s1). To see that s i2 is a best response to s1 for player i, notice that pi(s1/s i2)  q , which is
a maximizer of u i . For j , i, it also holds that s j2 is a best response to s1. Indeed, under s1, player i plays action
p(0) at history , the same action as under σ1. In the subgame G(p(0)), the strategy profile s1 coincides with σ1
while s j2 coincides with σ
j
2. Since σ
j
2 is a best response to σ1, it follows that s
j
2 is a best response to s1 for player j.
We argue that s3 ∈ B(s2). To see that s i3 is a best response to s2 for player i, notice that pi(s2/s i3)  q, which is
a maximizer of u i . For j , i, it also holds that s j3 is a best response to s2. Indeed, under s2, player i plays action
q(0) at history , the same action as under τ0. In the subgame G(q(0)), the strategy profile s2 coincides with τ0
while s j3 coincides with τ
j
1. Since τ
j
1 is a best response to τ0, it follows that s
j
3 is a best response to s2 for player j.
We argue that s0 ∈ B(s3). To see that s i0 is a best response to s3 for player i, notice that pi(s3/s i0)  p, which is
a maximizer of u i . For j , i, it also holds that s j0 is a best response to s3. Indeed, under s3, player i plays action
q(0) at history , the same action as under τ1. In the subgame G(q(0)), the strategy profile s3 coincides with
τ1 while s
j
0 coincides with τ
j
2. Since τ
j
2 is a best response to τ1, it follows that s
j
0 is a best response to s3 for
player j. 
Let ci denote the number of elements in the image of the function u i , and let c(G)  c1 + · · · + cn . We now
prove Theorem 3.1 by induction on c(G). Clearly, the conclusion of Theorem 3.1 holds for any n-player game G
with c(G)  n. Consider some l > n and assume that every n-player game G with c(G) < l has a best-response
cycle of length four. By way of contradiction, suppose the n-player game G is such that c(G) l, whereas G has
no best-response cycle of length four.
Using recursion, we define a sequence h0 , h1 , . . . of histories as follows: Let h0 . By our supposition, G(h0)
G has no best-response cycle of length four. Let ht be a history of length t ∈  such that G(ht) has no best-
response cycle of length four, and define it  ι(ht). It holds that c(G(ht))  l. Lemma 4.2 now implies that
there is a unique action at ∈ A(ht) such that W it ∩ P(ht) ⊆ P(ht , at). We define A′(ht)  A(ht)\{at}. For every
a′ ∈ A′(ht), consider the subgame G(ht , a′). Every play of the subgame G(ht , a′) yields player it a payoff strictly
below w it . Consequently, c(G(ht , a′)) < l, and the induction hypothesis implies that the subgame G(ht , a′) has
a best-response cycle of length four. Since G(ht) has no best-response cycle of length four, Lemma 4.1 implies
that G(ht , at) has no best-response cycle of length four. We define ht+1  (ht , at), which completes the recursion.
The sequences ht and at thus defined have the following properties: for every t ∈ ,
1. h0  and ht+1  (ht , at),
2. the subgame G(ht) has no best-response cycle of length four, and
3. for each a′ ∈ A′(ht), the subgame G(ht , a′) has a best-response cycle of length four.
To gain some intuition into the remainder of the proof, we resort to an analogy with quitting games. We
say that player it continues at period t if he plays action at at history ht , and we say that it quits at period t if
he plays an action a′ ∈ A′(ht) at ht . By property 3 above, as soon as a player quits at some period, we enter a
subgame that has a best-response cycle of length four.
For each t ∈, let Qt be the set of histories of the form (ht , a′) for some a′ ∈A′(ht). We call any subgame G(q)
of G where q ∈Qt for some t ∈  a quitting subgame. Using the axiom of choice, we can choose a best-response
cycle (σq , 0 , σq , 1 , σq , 2 , σq , 3 , σq , 0) of length four in G(q) for every quitting subgame G(q).
We next truncate the game G at some suitably chosen period t∗ by deleting all quitting actions after period t∗
and show that the game G∗ thus obtained has a best-response cycle of length four. Furthermore, such a best-
response cycle of length four, together with the best-response cycles of length four previously fixed in the
quitting subgames, yields a best-response cycle of length four of the original game G. This last argument relies
on the choice of t∗. Roughly speaking, t∗ is to be chosen so that a player can do no worse by quitting at or
before t∗ than by quitting after t∗.
To choose the period t∗ , suppose that in each quitting subgame G(q), player i’s opponents follow the strategy
profile σq , k . We can compute the highest payoff player i can get by quitting at any period t. The period t∗ is
chosen such that the highest payoff player i can get by quitting at or before t∗ is at least as large as the highest
payoff i can get by quitting after t∗.
We proceed to formal definitions of t∗ and G∗. Consider a period t ∈, a history q ∈Qt , a player i ∈ I, and an
index k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Let
x iq , k U
i
q(σq , k/σiq , k+1).
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This is the highest payoff that player i can get when playing against the strategy profile σq , k in the subgame
G(q). If i  it and Qt ,, let
y it , k maxq∈Qt
x iq , k .
In this case, y it , k is the highest payoff player i  it can get by quitting at period t, assuming that in each quitting
subgame G(q), player i’s opponents follow the strategy profile σq , k . If i , it or Qt  , we define y it , k to be a
number that is smaller than any number in the image of u i . Define
y ik maxt∈ y
i
t , k .
Since the player set I is finite, there is t∗ ∈  such that for every i ∈ I and every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
max
{t∈: t≤t∗}
y it , k  y
i
k .
Consider the game G∗ that is identical to the game G, except that for every t > t∗, the only action available at
history ht is at . Formally, let H∗ be the set consisting of histories h ∈H such that there is no t > t∗ and no q ∈Qt
with q ≤ h. Let G∗ be the game with set of histories H∗ and function ι∗ equal to the restriction of ι to H∗. The
set of plays in G∗ is denoted byP∗. For i ∈ I , the payoff function in G∗ is given by u∗i , the restriction of u i to P∗ ,
and the induced payoff function is denoted U∗i .
The subgame G∗(ht∗ , at∗) has only one play, (at∗+1 , at∗+2 , . . .), so trivially has a best-response cycle of length four.
Applying Lemma 4.1 to the games G∗(ht∗), G∗(ht∗−1), . . . ,G∗(h1), and G∗()G∗ repeatedly, we find that the game
G∗ has a best-response cycle of length four
(τ∗0 , τ∗1 , τ∗2 , τ∗3 , τ∗0)
such that, for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, for every t ≤ t∗, for every q ∈Qt , the strategy τ∗k agrees with σq , k . Notice that,
for every t > t∗, τ∗k(ht) at by definition of G∗.
Next, for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we extend τ∗k to a strategy profile τk defined on the set H of histories in the
game G. For every h ∈ H∗, we define τk(h)  τ∗k(h), and for every t > t∗ and every q ∈ Qt , we let τk agree with
the strategy profile σq , k in the subgame G(q).
The following result completes the proof of the theorem as we obtain a contradiction to our supposition that
G has no best-response cycle of length four.
Lemma 4.3. The sequence (τ0 , τ1 , τ2 , τ3 , τ0) is a best-response cycle of length four in G.
Proof. Let i ∈ I and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be given. We show that τik+1 is a best response of player i to τk . Let αi be any
strategy of player i. We argue that U i(τk/αi) ≤U i(τk/τik+1).
If pi(τk/αi) is a play of the game G∗, the result follows by definition of τk and τk+1.
Suppose that pi(τk/αi) is not a play of the game G∗. This implies that under the strategy profile τk none of
i’s opponents ever quits and that player i’s strategy αi requires player i to quit at a period t+ > t∗ using some
action a+ ∈ A′(ht+). Let q+  (ht+ , a+). Since τk agrees with the strategy profile σq+ ,k in G(q+), it holds that
U i(τk/αi) ≤ x iq+ , k ≤ y it+ , k .
By the choice of t∗ there is some t− ≤ t∗ such that
y it+ , k ≤ y it− , k .
It holds that it−  i and Qt− ,. Take any history q−  (ht− , a−) in Qt− such that
y it− , k  x
i
q− , k .
Let βi be player i’s strategy that requires player i to continue at each period t < t−, to quit at period t− using
the action a−, and then to play according to the strategy σiq− , k+1 in the quitting subgame G(q−). Then
x iq− , k U
i(τk/βi).
Combining the above inequalities, we see that U i(τk/αi) ≤U i(τk/βi). On the other hand, since the play induced
by the strategy profile τk/βi is a play of the game G∗, we have U i(τk/βi) ≤U i(τk/τik+1). This implies the desired
inequality. 
By construction, τik+1 is the best strategy a player i ∈ I can use against the strategy profile τk , if i is not allowed
to quit after period t∗. To prove the lemma, we show that player i cannot do better by quitting later. To see this,
suppose that under the strategy profile τk none of the other players ever quits. Suppose that player i decides to
quit at some period t+ > t∗. The highest payoff player i can obtain in this way is y it+ , k . The definition of t
∗ now
guarantees that player i would not be worse off quitting at or before period t∗ instead.
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5. Conclusion
Even win-lose games, two-player zero-sum perfect information games where the payoff of a player is either
zero or one, may fail to have Nash equilibria or, equivalently, best-response cycles of length one. We consider
general n-player perfect information games, where the payoff functions of the players have a finite image. We
do not make any assumptions on the set of available actions, and we do not make any further assumptions on
the payoff functions. We show that in any such game there is a best-response cycle of length four. This result
implies the existence of point-rationalizable strategy profiles. The strategies in a best-response cycle cannot
be eliminated by any procedure of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of payoff
functions with a bounded image, we find that there is always an –best-response cycle of length four.
One might wonder whether there also exist best-response cycles of length two or three. In two-player games,
the existence of a best-response cycle of length two is equivalent to the existence of Nash equilibrium. Indeed,
suppose that the sequence (σ0 , σ1 , σ0) of strategy profiles is a best-response cycle of length two, where σk  (σ1k , σ2k)
for k  0, 1. Then σ11 is player 1’s best response to player 2’s strategy σ20 while σ20 is player 2’s best response to
player 1’s strategy σ11 . Consequently, the strategy profile (σ11 , σ20) is a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that the
existence of best-response cycles of length two cannot be guaranteed under the conditions of Theorem 3.1.
We do not know whether a best-response cycle of length three exists under these conditions. While parts
of the proof of Theorem 3.1 could be generalized to deal with best-response cycles of any finite length, the
construction of Lemma 4.2 crucially relies on best-response cycles of length four.
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